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I. INTRODUCTION
Mandamus relief is “appropriate when a petitioner demonstrates a
clear abuse of discretion and has no adequate remedy by appeal.”1 How-
ever, mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy and not a matter of right.2
* Justice, (Former), Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas; Dorsey & Whitney,
LLP, Dallas, Texas. B.S.B.A., Drake University; J.D., University of Missouri. Prior to join-
ing the bench, Justice Lang was a partner in the Dallas office of Gardere Wynne Sewell
L.L.P. Justice Lang clerked for the Hon. Fred L. Henley of the Supreme Court of Missouri
from May 1972 to May 1973.
** Staff Attorney, Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas. B.S., Arizona State Uni-
versity; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. In re Geomet Recycling LLC, 578 S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
2. “‘Mandamus . . . is an extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at
the discretion of the court. Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is
largely controlled by equitable principles.’” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
387
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Although the Texas Supreme Court’s mandamus opinions during the past
year drew on previously recognized applications, mandamus relief in the
supreme court remains, as always, dependent on the particular circum-
stances of each case. This article analyzes, summarizes, and categorizes
the seven supreme court mandamus opinions3 delivered during the Sur-
vey period of December 1, 2018, through November 30, 2019, with partic-
ular focus on the supreme court’s treatment of the element of lack of an
adequate appellate remedy.
II. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
The Texas Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over writs of mandamus stems
from the Texas constitution.4 Specifically, section three of article five
states, in part, (1) “under such regulations as may be prescribed by law,”
the supreme court and its justices “may issue the writs of mandamus . . .
and such other writs, as may be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction”; and
(2) the Texas Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the supreme
court to “issue writs of . . . mandamus in such cases as may be specified,
except as against the Governor of the State.”5
Consistent with those constitutional grants of authority, Section
22.002(a) of the Texas Government Code provides that the supreme court
or a justice of that court
may issue . . . all writs of . . . mandamus agreeable to the principles of
law regulating those writs, against a statutory county court judge, a
statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a
justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government ex-
cept the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the
court of criminal appeals.6
Further, Government Code Section 22.002 states, (1) “[t]he supreme
court or, in vacation, a justice of the supreme court may issue a writ of
mandamus to compel a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate
court judge, or a district judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a case,”
and (2)
[o]nly the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ of manda-
mus . . . against any of the officers of the executive departments of
124, 138 n.61 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858
S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993)).
3. See In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re
Geomet Recycling, 578 S.W.3d at 82; In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2019) (orig.
proceeding); In re Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt., L.L.C., 575 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2019)
(orig. proceeding); In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding); In re Hous.
Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
4. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6.
5. Id. § 3. Also, section six of article five provides in part that the intermediate appel-
late courts of Texas shall have “appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their
respective districts” and “such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be pre-
scribed by law.” Id. § 6.
6. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
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the government of this state to order or compel the performance of a
judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act or duty that, by state law,
the officer or officers are authorized to perform.7
Additionally, a number of Texas statutes and rules provide for mandamus
proceedings in certain courts as to specifically identified matters.8
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52 provides procedural require-
ments for mandamus proceedings in both the supreme court and the
courts of appeals.9 When the supreme and appellate courts both have
mandamus jurisdiction, a petitioner to the supreme court must explain a
compelling reason in the petition why petitioner presented first to the
supreme court.10 Further, failure to comply with the additional require-
ments of Rule 52 may result in denial of relief.11
III. MANDAMUS STATISTICS
Statistics for the supreme court’s five most recent fiscal years show that
dispositions, year to year, have been close to or in excess of the petitions
filed.12 Further, the rate at which the petitions have been granted in that
7. Id. §§ 22.002(b)–(c). The mandamus jurisdiction of the Texas courts of appeals is
less broad than that of the supreme court. Specifically, pursuant to Government Code Sec-
tion 22.221, (1) each of the fourteen courts of appeals or a justice thereof “may issue a writ
of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court”; and (2)
each court of appeals may issue writs of mandamus against “a judge of a district, statutory
county, statutory probate county, or county court in the court of appeals district” and cer-
tain magistrates and associate judges. Id. §§ 22.221(a)–(b).
8. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (“supreme court or court of appeals
may issue writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in
connection with the holding of an election or a political party convention, regardless of
whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public officer”); TEX. R. APP.
P. 24.4(a) (a party may seek supreme court mandamus review of court of appeals’ ruling on
a motion challenging a trial court’s determination of amount of security required to super-
sede judgment); In re Occidental Chem. Corp., 561 S.W.3d 146, 153 (Tex. 2018) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (concluding statute gives Texas Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear and
determine certain suits involving imposition of ad valorem taxes by multiple taxing units
on same property confers original mandamus jurisdiction in supreme court); City of Hous.
v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 576, 583 (Tex. 2018) (affirming denial
of city’s plea to jurisdiction where suit for mandamus was proper proceeding to compel
disclosure of information pursuant to Texas Public Information Act and other nondiscre-
tionary governmental action required by law); In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 617
(Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (concluding statutory language allowed for Texas Supreme
Court mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute).
9. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2. “The party seeking the relief in a mandamus proceeding
is the relator. . . . [T]he person against whom relief is sought . . . is the respondent. A
person whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought is a real party in
interest and a party to the case.” Id.
10. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e); see also State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 793–94 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding) (“a party may not circumvent the court of appeals simply by argu-
ing futility”).
11. See, e.g., In re Charboneau, No. 05-18-00551-CV, 2018 WL 2276226, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 18, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Phillips, No. 05-18-00543-
CV, 2018 WL 2213888, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 15, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.); In re Wade, No. 05-17-00046-CV, 2017 WL 462364, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2,
2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
12. See OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE
TEXAS JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2019, Detail 4 (2019), available at https://
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period, in the range from 3.3% to 7.5%, demonstrates that mandamus is
indeed an “extraordinary” remedy.13
Texas Supreme Court Mandamus Statistics: Past Five Fiscal Years
FISCAL YEAR 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 
New petitions filed 209 215 187 188 220 
Total dispositions 214 217 181 194 225 
Petitions denied 80% 76.5% 79% 79.8% 72% 
Petitions granted 3.3% 6.9% 6.6% 6.7% 7.5% 
IV. SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES OF RECENT TEXAS
SUPREME COURT MANDAMUS CASES INVOLVING
STANDARD OF ALLEGED ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND NO ADEQUATE
REMEDY BY APPEAL
A. DENIAL OF RULE 91A MOTION TO DISMISS
In re Houston Specialty Insurance Co.14 involved the trial court’s im-
proper denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 91a.1.15 A coal company was sued by property owners, the
Carters, who alleged the company had mined coal under their property
without authorization. The coal company’s insurer, Houston Specialty In-
surance Co. (HSIC), denied the coal company’s request for a defense and
coverage. The coal company filed third-party claims against HSIC in the
Carters’ lawsuit, which eventually ended in a settlement.16
By letter, HSIC (1) accused its law firm, Thompson, Coe, Cousins, &
Irons, LLP, of committing legal malpractice by advising HSIC that it did
not owe a duty to defend the coal company against the Carters’ claims;
and (2) demanded that Thompson Coe pay it more than $2.8 million.
Thompson Coe responded by filing a lawsuit against HSIC requesting
declarations under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)17
pertaining to the law firm’s nonliability for legal malpractice regarding its
coverage advice and the Carters’ settlement.18 HSIC moved to dismiss
Thompson Coe’s lawsuit under Rule 91a, contending Thompson Coe’s
www.txcourts.gov/media/1445760/fy-19-annual-statistical-report.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2019]. The disposition totals in this chart include petitions for writs
of mandamus dismissed, abated, struck, or withdrawn during the respective fiscal year. Id.
Further, dispositions for a particular fiscal year can include pending petitions for writ of
mandamus filed in previous fiscal years. Id.
13. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceed-
ing); ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2019, supra note 12, at Detail 4.
14. 569 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
15. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1 (“[A] party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the
grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.”).
16. In re Hous. Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d at 139.
17. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001–.011.
18. In re Hous. Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d at 139.
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claims had “no basis in law” because under Abor v. Black,19 a potential
tort defendant cannot use the UDJA to obtain a declaration of nonliabil-
ity in tort. The trial court denied HSIC’s dismissal motion. After being
denied mandamus relief in the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals,
HSIC sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court stated (1) “each of Thompson Coe’s requested dec-
larations are aimed at establishing a defense to a potential legal malprac-
tice claim by HSIC”; and (2) therefore, the first required mandamus
element—abuse of discretion by the trial court—“is easily met because
the trial court’s denial of HSIC’s Rule 91a motion is a clear abuse of
discretion under Abor v. Black.”20 The supreme court specifically re-
jected Thompson Coe’s arguments that (1) “trial courts have discretion-
ary jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action seeking declarations
of nonliability in tort”; and (2) “a trial court may retain such an action if
the tortfeasor-plaintiff also requests declarations that do not expressly
ask for a determination of liability.”21 In doing so, the supreme court dis-
approved of the case relied on by Thompson Coe, Hernandez v. Abra-
ham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels & Friend.22 According to the supreme
court, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals in Hernandez wrongly
characterized Abor “as ‘confirming’ that a trial court has jurisdiction to
hear a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of nonliability
in tort and as teaching that a ‘trial court [has only] limited discretion to
refuse to hear [such] a declaratory judgment action.’”23
Next, the supreme court noted it has “confirmed that ‘mandamus relief
is appropriate to “spare private parties and the public the time and
money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly con-
ducted proceedings.”’”24 The supreme court concluded that because “[a]
legally invalid lawsuit that ‘deprive[s] the real plaintiff of the traditional
right to choose the time and place of suit’ satisfies this test,” mandamus
relief directing the trial court to grant HSIC’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss
was appropriate.25
B. ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION
In In re RSR Corp., the Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief
to prevent a “do-over” in an attorney-disqualification dispute.26 In the
underlying lawsuit, RSR Corp. (RSR) sued Inppamet Ltd. for misappro-
priation of trade secrets, theft, and breach of contract. “Inppamet moved
19. 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding).
20. In re Hous. Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d at 140–41.
21. Id.
22. See Hernandez v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels & Friend, 451 S.W.3d 58
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
23. In re Hous. Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d at 141 (quoting Hernandez, 451 S.W.3d
at 64).
24. Id. at 142 (quoting In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. 2014) (orig.
proceeding)).
25. Id.
26. In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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to disqualify RSR’s counsel,” alleging “RSR and its counsel had obtained
Inppamet’s privileged and confidential information from a former Inp-
pamet employee.”27 Inppamet contended in part that disqualification was
required under the fact-intensive disqualification guidelines of In re Mea-
dor.28 However, nearly two weeks after a hearing before a discovery spe-
cial master, Inppamet filed a letter brief contending the presumption-
based standard of In re American Home Products Corp.29 “controlled the
disqualification inquiry to the exclusion of consideration under [In re]
Meador.”30
“[T]he special master denied Inppamet’s sanctions motion.”31 Inp-
pamet then appealed “to the trial court for a de novo ruling” and “the
trial court disqualified RSR’s counsel”32 based on the presumptions in In
re American Home Products. That disqualification ruling gave rise to a
2015 mandamus proceeding33 in which the supreme court “reaffirmed
that American Home Products’ disqualification presumptions apply only
to side-switching legal staff, while the factors articulated in In re Meador
guide the disqualification inquiry when counsel obtains privileged and
confidential information from fact witnesses who were neither legal staff
nor supervised by lawyers for an opposing party.”34 The supreme court
concluded that because the alleged violations involved employees who
were neither legal staff nor supervised lawyers, “the trial court erred in
applying American Home Products’s presumptions instead of the [In re]
Meador factors.”35 The supreme court “direct[ed] the trial court to vacate
its disqualification order, but declined to ‘decide whether disqualification
would have been proper under [In re] Meador because the trial court did
not reach the issue and did not resolve all fact issues relevant to a [In re]
Meador analysis.’”36
The case returned to the trial court, where Inppamet filed motions to
“reconsider disqualification under [In re] Meador” and to compel discov-
ery necessary for “a [In re] Meador-based disqualification analysis.”37 Af-
ter another hearing, the special master denied the discovery motion,
stating that Inppamet “chose to forego” the same discovery before the
prior hearing and thus its discovery motion was untimely.38 The trial
court adopted the special master’s order and “denied the request for re-
consideration as ‘untimely, dilatory in nature, and/or waived.’”39 Inp-
27. Id. at 664.
28. See 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
29. See 985 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
30. In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d at 665.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.3d at 68).
33. See In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775, 782 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
34. In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d at 664.
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pamet sought and obtained mandamus relief in the Fifth Dallas Court of
Appeals, which directed the trial court to “vacate its order and determine
the motion to reconsider on its merits under [In re] Meador.”40 RSR then
petitioned for mandamus relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court concluded “[t]he trial court did not clearly abuse its
discretion in concluding that Inppamet is not entitled to a do-over under
these circumstances,”41 as courts must discourage the use of disqualifica-
tion motions as a dilatory trial tactic.42 Here, (1) Inppamet “changed its
legal strategy in the middle of the proceedings, unequivocally abandoning
[In re] Meador and fervently dissuading the trial court from applying it”;
and (2) there were no changes to the factual allegations or law between
that abandonment and the later embrace.43 Thus, the supreme court
stated, “[t]his case lies at the intersection of dilatoriness and waiver.”44
Further, the supreme court concluded an appellate remedy was inade-
quate because “another round of costly disqualification litigation would
unduly and unjustly delay the trial and final disposition of this ten-year-
old dispute.”45 RSR’s mandamus petition was conditionally granted and
the court of appeals was directed to “reinstate the trial court’s order de-
nying Inppamet’s motion to reconsider disqualification under [In re]
Meador.”46
In re Thetford47 addressed “whether the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct require that a lawyer be disqualified from repre-
senting one client who is applying to be appointed guardian for another
current or former client.”48 In 2015, eighty-four-year-old Verna Thetford
executed a will and power of attorney prepared by attorney Alfred G.
Allen, III. Verna designated her niece Jamie Rogers as her attorney-in-
fact, preferred guardian, and sole beneficiary.49 Three years earlier,
Verna and her husband loaned Jamie $350,000.00 to purchase real estate
and Allen represented the Thetfords in preparing the five-year note and
deed of trust pertaining to that transaction also.
In 2016, Verna’s mental state began to deteriorate. In 2017, the five-
year note became due. At that time, Allen’s law firm employed Jamie.50
Verna claimed Allen refused her request to write Jamie a demand letter,
though Allen denied such a request was ever made. Verna hired another
attorney, Stephen Crawford, and executed a revocation of her power of
attorney.51 Two weeks later, “Jamie, represented by Allen, filed an appli-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 667.
42. Id. at 666.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 667.
46. Id.
47. 574 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
48. Id. at 365.
49. Id. at 366.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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cation for temporary guardianship of Verna’s person and a management
trust for her estate.”52
Verna “moved to disqualify Allen as Jamie’s counsel” because “Allen
had ‘obtained confidential information’ during his representations of
[Verna] that ‘could be used to [her] disadvantage . . . in the current mat-
ter’, and that she objected to his representation of Jamie in violation of
his fiduciary duties to her.”53 According to Verna, Allen’s representation
of Jamie without her consent was a conflict of interest under Disciplinary
Rules 1.06(a) and (b).54 Attached to Verna’s motion was a statement
from her doctor in which he (1) concluded she did not meet the criteria
for dementia; and (2) stated she had told him she believed Jamie had
been prompted to have her deemed incompetent because the five-year
note was due.55
In response, Jamie argued (1) the note had been paid in full subsequent
to Verna’s motion to disqualify Allen; and (2) pursuant to Disciplinary
Rule 1.02(g), Allen had “a mandatory duty . . . to secure the appointment
of a guardian for the person and . . . estate of Mrs. Thetford due to his
reasonable belief that she lacks legal competence.”56 The trial court de-
nied Verna’s motion to disqualify Allen and the court of appeals denied
mandamus relief.
Verna was unsuccessful in her attempt to obtain mandamus relief in the
Texas Supreme Court. That court’s analysis focused on the interplay of
Disciplinary Rules 1.02(g), 1.06, and 1.09.57 The supreme court stated that
52. Id.
53. Id. at 368.
54. Id.; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06, reprinted in TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, which states,
(a) A lawyer shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation.
(b) In other situations and except to the extent permitted by paragraph (c), a
lawyer shall not represent a person if the representation of that person:
(1) involves a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are
materially and directly adverse to the interests of another client of the
lawyer or the lawyer’s firm; or
(2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer’s or
law firm’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the
lawyer’s or law firms own interests.
55. In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 368.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 372; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(g), reprinted in
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (“A lawyer shall take reasonable action to
secure the appointment of a guardian or other legal representative for, or seek other pro-
tective orders with respect to, a client whenever the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client lacks legal competence and that such action should be taken to protect the client.”).
See also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.09, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, which states in part,
(a) Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly represented
a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in a
matter adverse to the former client:
(1) in which such other person questions the validity of the lawyer’s services
or work product for the former client
(2) if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of
Rule 1.05; or
(3) if it is the same or a substantially related matter.
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even assuming Rule 1.02(g) was applicable, “it did not mandate that Al-
len initiate the guardianship but must be read together with the conflict-
of-interest rules to determine whether filing the application for Jamie was
‘reasonable action.’”58 The supreme court reasoned that “[t]o prevail in
having Allen disqualified, Verna must show that (1) Allen’s representa-
tions of her are substantially related to the matters in the guardianship
proceeding, and (2) the guardianship proceeding is adverse to her.”59 The
first requirement was not met because the record did not show “that Al-
len’s prior representations of [Verna] create[d] a genuine risk that he
w[ould] reveal her confidences to Jamie.”60 Additionally, the supreme
court stated (1) “[f]or this guardianship proceeding to be adverse to
Verna, Jamie’s interests would have to be adverse to Verna’s interests as
seen by Verna before she became incapacitated”; and (2) “nothing in the
record indicates that Jamie has interests adverse to Verna’s wellbeing.”61
Further, the supreme court observed that the trial court’s “careful deci-
sion” regarding disqualification “is not final,” as the trial court “can re-
visit the issue, change its mind later, and disqualify counsel at a later stage
if other information comes to light.”62 The supreme court declined to
“disturb the trial court’s discretion” and, accordingly, denied the petition
for writ of mandamus without reaching the element of lack of an ade-
quate appellate remedy.63
C. IMPROPER LIFTING OF LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED STAY
In In re Geomet Recycling LLC,64 the Texas Supreme Court concluded
mandamus relief was proper where a court of appeals’ order erroneously
purported to lift a legislatively mandated stay of trial court proceedings.65
EMR, a scrap metal recycling business, sued Geomet Recycling, alleging,
among other things, trade secret misappropriation and breach of fiduci-
ary duty. Early on, the trial court signed a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Geomet from using EMR’s trade secrets and confidential in-
formation. Geomet filed a motion to dismiss EMR’s claims pursuant to
the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and obtained an order al-
lowing limited discovery on that motion.66 EMR (1) moved for contempt
based on alleged violation of the TRO; and (2) requested a temporary
injunction. The parties signed an agreed scheduling order that provided
for continuances of the contempt and temporary-injunction hearings in
the event of an interlocutory appeal on the still-pending TCPA motion.
58. In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 373.
59. Id. at 374.
60. Id. at 375.
61. Id. at 379–80.
62. Id. at 380.
63. Id. at 381.
64. 578 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
65. Id. at 85.
66. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003).
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Following the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion, Geomet filed an
interlocutory appeal in the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals, thus staying the
commencement of trial and “all other proceedings in the trial court pend-
ing resolution of that appeal” pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code Section 51.014(b).67 While the appeal was pending, EMR
asked the court of appeals to lift the stay so the trial court could address
its contempt and temporary-injunction motions. The court of appeals or-
dered the stay lifted “for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to
conduct a hearing on appellees’ request for temporary injunction and mo-
tion for contempt.”68 Geomet then petitioned the supreme court for man-
damus relief, challenging the court of appeals’ order lifting the stay.
The supreme court observed that Section 51.014(b)’s text (1) contains
no exceptions to the mandatory stay; and (2) “dictates that the stay lasts
until ‘resolution of th[e] appeal,’ not until the court of appeals lifts the
stay.”69 Further, the supreme court rejected EMR’s argument that au-
thority to lift the stay flowed from Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
29.370 and 29.4,71 as “procedural rules cannot authorize courts to act con-
trary to a statute.”72 EMR also argued that the constitution does not per-
mit the statute “to be applied in a way that renders the courts powerless
to prevent irreparable harm to a litigant.”73 The supreme court reasoned
that EMR was not without recourse because it could have asked the court
of appeals to protect it from irreparable harm, but instead chose to pur-
sue “an unsuited procedural mechanism.”74 Finally, the supreme court
stated “[t]here is generally no adequate remedy by appeal for an errone-
ous court order purporting to lift the stay.”75 The petition for writ of
mandamus was conditionally granted and the court of appeals was di-
rected to vacate its order.76
D. DISCOVERY
In In re City of Dickinson,77 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that a
client testifying as an expert witness in its own case did not waive the
attorney–client privilege as to that expert testimony.78 The City of Dick-
67. Id. at 86 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.014(a)–(b)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 87 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b)).
70. See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3 (“When an appeal from an interlocutory order is per-
fected, the appellate court may make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the par-
ties’ rights until disposition of the appeal . . . .”).
71. See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4 (“While an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending,
only the appellate court in which the appeal is pending may enforce the order.”).
72. In re Geomet Recycling LLC, 578 S.W.3d at 88.
73. Id. at 89.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 92 (citing In re Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 469 S.W.3d 255, 259 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2015, orig. proceeding) (“This right [to the stay], once violated, cannot
be recovered by appeal.”)).
76. Id.
77. 568 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
78. Id. at 649–50.
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inson sued Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (Texas Windstorm),
contending Texas Windstorm did not pay the full amount owed to the
City for hurricane damage under the City’s insurance policy. The City
moved for summary judgment as to causation. Texas Windstorm’s sum-
mary judgment response included an “affidavit of its corporate represen-
tative and senior claims examiner, Paul Strickland,” which contained
“both factual and expert opinion testimony.”79 During depositions, the
City learned Strickland’s affidavit had previously been revised in email
exchanges between Strickland and Texas Windstorm’s counsel. The City
moved to strike Strickland’s affidavit unless Texas Windstorm produced
those email exchanges and all other documents and data “provided to,
reviewed by, or prepared by or for Strickland in anticipation of his testi-
mony as an expert.”80 Texas Windstorm contended the emails were pro-
tected by attorney–client privilege, but also mistakenly e-filed fifty-five
pages of the purportedly privileged emails. The next day, Texas Wind-
storm discovered the filing error and invoked Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 193.3(d)’s “snap-back” provision,81 requesting that the City delete
or destroy the emails.
The trial court denied Texas Windstorm’s “snap-back” motion and
granted the City’s motion to compel the emails and other requested
items.82 Texas Windstorm obtained mandamus relief in the court of ap-
peals, which concluded the email exchanges and affidavit drafts were
privileged attorney–client communications notwithstanding Strickland’s
additional role as a testifying expert.83 The City then filed a mandamus
petition in the supreme court, contending the trial court did not abuse its
discretion because “[the] discovery rules expressly authorize the produc-
tion of all documents provided to Strickland in anticipation of his expert
testimony.”84
In its opinion, the supreme court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the
language and context of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194, which ad-
dresses the permissible content of requests for disclosure.85 The supreme
court observed that “nothing within [Rule 194] requires Texas Windstorm
to turn over testifying expert materials”; rather, that the rule “merely al-
lows the City to request them, subject to the other rules of discovery.”86
Further, the supreme court reasoned (1) without the attorney–client priv-
ilege, “attorneys would not be able to give their clients candid advice as is
an attorney’s professional duty”; and (2) “[a] lawyer’s candid advice and
counseling is no less important when a client also testifies as an expert.”87
The supreme court concluded that because the discovery rules “do not
79. Id. at 644.
80. Id.
81. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d).
82. In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d at 644.
83. Id. 644–45.
84. Id. at 645.
85. Id. at 645–48; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.
86. In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d at 647.
87. Id. at 649.
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operate to waive the attorney–client privilege whenever a client or its
representative offers expert testimony,” the court of appeals properly
overruled the trial court’s order compelling disclosure.88 Additionally, as
to the mistakenly-produced emails, the supreme court concluded that
“[b]ecause the emails are privileged communications and Texas Wind-
storm complied with Rule 193.3(d),” the court of appeals correctly deter-
mined the trial court abused its discretion by denying the “snap-back”
motion.89 Consequently, the supreme court denied the City’s petition for
writ of mandamus.90
E. MONETARY SANCTIONS
In In re Casey,91 the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether trial
courts are required to defer payment of monetary sanctions until an ap-
pealable judgment is rendered. Attorney Stephen Casey represented
Chad Walker and Alisha Flood in a dispute over a personal loan made to
them by a family member, Ann Coyle. Specifically, Walker and Flood
sued Coyle, an attorney, “for abstracting a judgment fraudulently claim-
ing they were in default” respecting satisfaction of a previous agreed
judgment involving the same loan.92 Coyle filed counterclaims against
Walker and Flood and initiated a third-party action against Casey for
monetary, declaratory, and equitable relief.
Casey moved to dismiss Coyle’s claims as frivolous and designate her a
vexatious litigant pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.93 At the hearing on that motion, Casey argued that cer-
tain pro se matters commenced by Coyle during the preceding seven
years “should count as separate litigation”94 for Chapter 11 purposes, and
thus, Chapter 11’s requisite number of pro se civil actions had been met.
The trial court granted Casey’s motion to dismiss Coyle’s claims and de-
clared her a vexatious litigant.
Casey moved for reconsideration of the vexatious litigant determina-
tion, arguing (1) several of the cases Casey had described as satisfying
Chapter 11’s criteria did not actually do so; and (2) “sanctions were war-
ranted because Casey had not disclosed directly adverse controlling pre-
cedent and had made groundless legal arguments.”95 Casey responded:
(1) his argument was entitled to a good faith presumption;96 and (2) “he
was not obligated to disclose [the] authority [in question] because it was
not controlling, not directly adverse, or both.”97 The trial court: (1)
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 650.
91. 589 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
92. Id. at 852.
93. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001–.104 (vexatious liti-
gants), 37.001–.011 (declaratory judgments)).
94. Id. at 853.
95. Id.
96. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
97. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d at 853.
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“granted Coyle’s [reconsideration] motion”; (2) “lifted the vexatious-liti-
gant determination”; (3) “ordered Casey to reimburse Coyle $8,521.50
for attorney’s fees,” with payment “required within ten business days”;
and (4) issued findings that Casey had misrepresented the law as to
whether certain proceedings constituted civil actions for Chapter 11 pur-
poses.98 Although Casey stated in a sworn declaration that deferring pay-
ment of the sanction was necessary to avoid precluding him and his
clients access to the courts to continue the litigation and seek meaningful
appellate review, the trial court declined to provide Casey any relief.
After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain mandamus relief in the Third
Austin Court of Appeals, Casey filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
the supreme court. The supreme court noted that in Braden v. Downey,99
it “acknowledged that the magnitude of monetary sanctions made paya-
ble before rendition of an appealable order could have a ‘preclusive ef-
fect on the violating party’s access to the courts’ and ‘should not
ordinarily be used to dispose of litigation.’”100 Consequently, the su-
preme court concluded in Braden that:
Subject to good-faith pleading requirements, when a litigant, like
Casey, “contends that a monetary sanction award precludes access to
the court,” the court “must either (1) provide that the sanction is
payable only at a date that coincides with or follows entry of a final
order terminating the litigation; or (2) make[ ] express written find-
ings, after a prompt hearing, as to why the award does not have a
preclusive effect.”101
The supreme court reasoned that “Casey’s [sworn] declaration was suf-
ficient to invoke Braden’s deferral requirement” and “also explains that
an appeal is inadequate because he lacks the financial means to make an
upfront sanctions payment while pursuing the merits.”102 Additionally,
the supreme court rejected Coyle’s argument that Braden does not apply
when sanctions do not exceed the amount necessary to compensate an
opposing party, like the attorney’s fees sanctions in question.103 Accord-
ing to the supreme court, “Braden’s focus is on the effect of a monetary
sanction that must be paid before it can be superseded and appealed, not
on a specific amount or purpose of the sanction.”104 The supreme court
concluded “deferral is required under Braden, and when satisfaction of
the sanctions order is so deferred, an adequate appellate remedy ex-
ists.”105 The supreme court thus declined to consider the propriety of the
98. Id. at 853–54.
99. 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
100. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d at 855 (quoting Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929).
101. Id. (quoting Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929).
102. Id. The supreme court noted, “[b]ecause Casey is not just an attorney in the case,
but also a litigant, we need not explore the circumstances that might substantially impact a
client’s access to the courts when monetary sanctions are imposed only on counsel.” Id.
103. Id. at 855–56.
104. Id. at 856.
105. Id. at 854.
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underlying sanctions order.106 The petition for writ of mandamus was
conditionally granted.107
F. NON-PARTY’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
In Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District v. State (In re Sus-
tainable Texas Oyster Resources Management, L.L.C.),108 the Texas Su-
preme Court denied a mandamus petition related to a non-party’s
attempted participation in the interlocutory appeal of a denial of a plea to
the jurisdiction.109 A government entity, the Chambers-Liberty Counties
Navigation District (the District), leased submerged land to a private en-
tity, Sustainable Texas Oyster Resources Management, L.L.C. (STORM),
to cultivate, harvest, and store oysters. The State sued the District and
STORM, contending the lease was void because the State, not the Dis-
trict, has “the sole power to decide who may . . . cultivate oysters in the
[submerged,] disputed area.”110 The State sought (1) a declaratory judg-
ment that the District and its commissioners exceeded their lawful au-
thority and thus acted ultra vires by entering into the lease; and (2)
monetary damages from the District and STORM.111 The District filed a
plea to the jurisdiction, “asserting that [its] immunity from suit bar[red]
the State’s claims.”112 The trial court denied the plea and the District
filed an interlocutory appeal in the Third Austin Court of Appeals.113
“The court of appeals reversed the portion of the trial court’s order that
permitted the State to pursue an ultra vires claim against the District it-
self” and “otherwise affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdic-
tion.”114 STORM did not participate in the interlocutory appeal as a
party, request party status, or seek mandamus relief in the court of ap-
peals, but it submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the District’s
motion for rehearing.
The District filed a petition for review in the supreme court challenging
the court of appeals’ ruling. STORM filed: (1) a petition for review in
that case, arguing “it should be allowed to participate . . . as a party under
the virtual-representation doctrine”;115 and (2) a petition for writ of man-
106. Id. (citing City of Hous. v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 577
(Tex. 2018)).
107. Id. at 856.
108. 575 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
109. Id. at 341–42.
110. Id. at 341.
111. Id. at 343.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 343–44; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing for
interlocutory appeal of order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a govern-
mental unit).
114. In re Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt., 575 S.W.3d at 344.
115. Id. at 355 (“The virtual-representation doctrine is an equitable doctrine allowing a
party to ‘intervene’ on appeal in circumstances where ‘it will be bound by the judgment, its
privity of interest appears from the record, and there is an identity of interest between the
litigant and a named party to the judgment.’” (quoting In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
184 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)).
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damus, asserting the same arguments regarding the lease’s validity that it
asserted in its petition for review. As to the District, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in part and affirmed it in part,
concluding immunity barred the State’s claims for ultra vires and mone-
tary relief against the District but not its ultra vires claim against the Dis-
trict’s commissioners.116
Then, the supreme court addressed STORM’s attempted participa-
tion.117 The supreme court stated that “[e]ven if STORM had made a
good case for party status under the [equitable doctrine of] virtual-repre-
sentation . . . STORM did not seek party status in the court of appeals”
and thus had not timely invoked that doctrine.118 Nor were there other-
wise any equitable considerations that compelled that doctrine’s invoca-
tion. Further, the supreme court stated STORM’s mandamus action
“suffers from a similar infirmity.”119 Specifically, “STORM d[id] not offer
a compelling reason” for not seeking mandamus review in the court of
appeals.120 Additionally, “mandamus relief is reserved for extraordinary
circumstances.”121 The supreme court concluded it “need not take the
unusual procedural steps of treating [STORM] as a party or formally tak-
ing up its mandamus petition in order to carefully consider its argu-
ments,” because “[t]reating STORM’s briefing and the arguments of its
counsel as those of an amicus curiae, we have understood the impact of
our decision on STORM and have fully considered STORM’s arguments
in deciding this appeal.”122




120. Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e).
121. In re Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt., 575 S.W.3d at 356.
122. Id.
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The chart above summarizes how the Texas Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the “lack of adequate appellate remedy” element in mandamus
cases decided during the Survey period. The disparity in the supreme
court’s treatment of that critical element warrants a deeper look at that
issue.
The “black letter law”123 requires a party seeking mandamus relief to
“meet two requirements.”124 As stated above, “[m]andamus relief is ap-
123. See Mariner Fin. Grp. v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. 2002) (“The black letter
rules of law are sparse and analogous case law is difficult to locate.”) (citing Lifecare Int’l,
Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Collins v. Va., 138 S. Ct.
1663, 1670 (2019) (referring to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of curtilage as long
recognized “black letter law”).
124. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
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propriate when a petitioner demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion and
has no adequate remedy by appeal.”125 However, the meaning of “ade-
quate” can be elusive. In order to appraise whether any appellate remedy
is “adequate,” the supreme court devised a subjective, balancing test.
That is, the benefits of granting mandamus regarding “significant rulings
in exceptional cases” are to be weighed against the detriments of interfer-
ing with trial court proceedings and adding to litigation’s burdens.126
The particular and complex language used by the supreme court to de-
scribe the intricacies of the test must be carefully digested:
The operative word, “adequate,” has no comprehensive definition; it
is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considera-
tions that determine when appellate courts will use original manda-
mus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. These
considerations implicate both public and private interests. Manda-
mus review of incidental, interlocutory rulings by the trial courts un-
duly interferes with trial court proceedings, distracts appellate court
attention to issues that are unimportant both to the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case at hand and to the uniform development of the law,
and adds unproductively to the expense and delay of civil litigation.
Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be
essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights
from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed
and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive
in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the
public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal
of improperly conducted proceedings. An appellate remedy is “ade-
quate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by
the detriments. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appel-
late courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is
adequate.127
In light of the comprehensive directions provided in In re Prudential
and its progeny, one might expect an appellate court to decide each man-
damus case by providing a full analysis of the merits of the “two require-
ments,” clear abuse of discretion and whether any appellate remedy is
adequate. However, a review of mandamus opinions issued in the last few
years reveals that the supreme court does not always address that second
critical issue of adequacy, or if it does, frequently, it does so in only a
conclusory manner.128 Specifically, some opinions regarding mandamus
have addressed the “adequacy” element without discussion, using only
125. See In re Geomet Recycling LLC, 578 S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
126. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
127. Id.
128. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 63 requires the supreme court to “hand down a
written opinion in all cases in which it renders judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 63. However, a
court of appeals is required to “address[ ] every issue raised and necessary to final disposi-
tion of the appeal.” See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; Sky Interests Corp. v. Moisdon, No. 05-
18-00160-CV, 2019 WL 3423279, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
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conclusory language.129 In still other cases, the adequacy of the appellate
remedy is not addressed, but cases are cited.130 Yet, in other opinions, the
supreme court has been completely silent as to the element of
129. To name only a few, see the following cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang &
Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court,
66 SMU L. REV. 1155, 1177 (2013): In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628 (Tex.
2012) (orig. proceeding); In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); In re Cook, 356 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re
Does, 337 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Guar. Ins. Servs.,
Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d
220 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re Serv. Corp. Int’l, 355 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); In re Serv. Corp. Int’l, 355 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. 2011) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (per curiam); In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404 (Tex.
2011) (orig. proceeding) . See also the following cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang &
Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 2
SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 261, 298 (2016): In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686
(Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re State Bar of Tex., 440 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2014) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam). See also the following cases cited in cited in Hon. Douglas S.
Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme
Court, 3 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 265 (2017): In re Keenan, 501 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); In re M–I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding);
In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 507 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In
re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). See also the following cases
cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Deci-
sions of the Texas Supreme Court, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 407 (2019): In re Mahindra,
USA Inc., 549 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530 (Tex.
2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Shipman, 540 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
130. For example, see the following mandamus cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang &
Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 2
SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 261, 298 (2016): In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 459
S.W.3d 565 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Dow, 481 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2015) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (per curiam); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); In re
Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); Royston, Rayzor,
Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); State v.
Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015); In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2014); In re Ford
Motor Co., 427 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Health Care
Unlimited, Inc., 429 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Nat’l
Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re
Whataburger Rest. LP, 429 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re
Vaishangi, 442 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). See also the follow-
ing cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Manda-
mus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 3 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 265 (2017): In re
Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re City of Dall., 501 S.W.3d 71
(Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708 (Tex.
2016) (orig. proceeding); In re Oceanografia S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). See also the following cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang
& Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme
Court, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 407, 430 (2019): In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.
2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd., 559
S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re State, 556 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. 2018) (orig.
proceeding); In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Acci-
dent Fund Gen. Ins. Co., 543 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re
Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding); In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532
S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding); In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595 (Tex.
2017) (orig. proceeding); In re Turner, 542 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
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“adequacy.”131
Silence as to “adequacy” is understandable in a few situations where a
party has a statutory, ministerial duty to act or when a statute expressly
provides for mandamus relief.132 Nevertheless, in In re Geomet Recycling,
the supreme court addressed adequacy of the appellate remedy even
though there was a statutory issue where the very act of the trial court
lifting a stay was in clear violation of a statute.133
There is another notable element missing in many mandamus opinions,
including three of the cases cited in this article. That is, besides silence as
to the key element of “adequacy,” there is no mention of the seminal In
re Prudential case regarding the “adequacy” element.134 In the case of In
re Thetford,135 the majority’s conclusion made it clear that the trial court
can “revisit” the disqualification of counsel issue if the facts change, but
“adequacy” was not addressed. That opinion instructed: “The record re-
flects that the trial court was well aware of the issues, considered them
thoughtfully, and made a careful decision. And it is not final. The court
131. See the following cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell,
Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 66 SMU L. REV. 1155
(2013): In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); In re United Scaffolding,
Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d
46 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam); In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). See
also the following cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of
Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 261
(2016): In re Office of the Att’y Gen., 456 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). See also the following
cases cited in Hon. Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus
Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 3 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 265 (2017): In re Heredia,
501 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1, 493
S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); and these cases cited infra: In re Thetford, 574
S.W.3d 362, 380–381 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding); In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d
642 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding); In re Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt., L.L.C., 575
S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
132. See Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs., 540 S.W.3d
553, 560 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court has a constitutional obligation to super-
vise and administer the judicial branch and is responsible for the orderly and efficient ad-
ministration of justice.” (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 31; then citing TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 74.021; and then citing In re Castillo, 201 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)).
In performing its designated functions, the supreme court may issue writs of mandamus or
grant other relief as necessary to compel officials to perform nondiscretionary acts when
the law so requires. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002; In re Castillo, 201 S.W.3d at 684; see
also In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769, 770–71 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus is
available to compel performance of ministerial duty of Texas Comptroller); In re Nestle
USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 617 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (concluding statutory lan-
guage allowed for supreme court mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax
statute).
133. In re Geomet Recycling, 578 S.W.3d 82, 91–92 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding)
(“There is generally no adequate remedy by appeal for an erroneous court order purport-
ing to lift the stay. See, e.g., In re Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 469 S.W.3d 255, 259 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2015, orig. proceeding) (‘This right [to the stay], once violated, cannot
be recovered by appeal.’).”).
134. See In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 380–381; In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d at
642; In re Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt., 575 S.W.3d at 339; see also supra note 129
and cases cited therein.
135. 574 S.W.3d at 380–81.
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can revisit the issue, change its mind later, and disqualify counsel at a
later stage if other information comes to light.”136 Similarly, the majority
in In re City of Dickinson137 concluded the trial court abused its discre-
tion by ordering privileged communications to be produced, yet there was
no discussion or conclusion at all respecting whether the appellate rem-
edy was adequate, nor was In re Prudential mentioned.138 Finally, in the
case of In re Sustainable Texas Oyster Resource Management, L.L.C.,139
the supreme court did cite In re Prudential, but only for the proposition
that mandamus is reserved for “extraordinary” circumstances.140 The
“adequacy” of any “appellate remedy” was not mentioned.
Because of the absence of discussion in many mandamus cases regard-
ing the “adequacy” of any appellate remedy or, in some cases, the ab-
sence of any reference to In re Prudential, an academic and practical
question arises: may intermediate appellate courts and practicing lawyers
ignore the element of the adequacy of the remedy by appeal? The answer
is “No.” Until the supreme court overrules141 In re Prudential or modifies
its holding in some way, it would be potentially fatal to a mandamus peti-
tion to omit full treatment of the adequacy of the appellate remedy.142
VI. CONCLUSION
Mandamus is an indispensable tool for litigants where “mid-course” er-
ror correction is required and interlocutory appeal is not available. While
some supreme court opinions may not address the issue of whether there
is an adequate remedy by appeal, the “black letter law” requires that a
petitioner fully address the balancing test supplied by In re Prudential to
demonstrate that lack of adequacy. The burden of proof for the relator
bringing a petition has not changed since In re Prudential was issued.
136. Id.; see also In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d at 649 (concluding trial court
abused its discretion in ordering privileged communication to be produced, but did not
address whether the appellate remedy was adequate or mention the seminal case describ-
ing the longstanding standards for mandamus, In re Prudential); In re Sustainable Tex.
Oyster Res. Mgmt., 575 S.W.3d at 356 (citing In re Prudential for proposition that manda-
mus is reserved for “extraordinary” circumstances, but not mentioning the terms “ade-
quacy” and any “appellate remedy”).
137. 568 S.W.3d at 642.
138. Id.
139. 575 S.W.3d at 356.
140. Id.
141. See Robinson v. Home Owners Mgmt. Enters., 590 S.W.3d 518, 528 n.46 (Tex.
2019) (citing ETC Mktg., Ltd. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 528 S.W.3d 70, 77–78 (Tex.
2017) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [the lower court] should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.” (quoting Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
142. According to reputable electronic research tools, Texas appellate courts have cited
In re Prudential, without question as to its authority, more than 2,600 times through the
date of this article.
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